The Importance of Being Less Earnest:
Promoting Canada’s National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.

J.L. Granatstein
Historian and Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century

Toronto, October 21, 2003
The C.D. Howe Institute is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that aims to improve Canadians' standard of living by fostering sound economic and social policy.

The Institute promotes the application of independent research and analysis to major economic and social issues affecting the quality of life of Canadians in all regions of the country. It takes a global perspective by considering the impact of international factors on Canada and bringing insights from other jurisdictions to the discussion of Canadian public policy. Policy recommendations in the Institute's publications are founded on quality research conducted by leading experts and subject to rigorous peer review. The Institute communicates clearly the analysis and recommendations arising from its work to the general public, the media, academia, experts, and policymakers.

The Institute began life in 1958 when a group of prominent business and labour leaders organized the Private Planning Association of Canada to research and promote educational activities on issues related to public economic and social policy. The PPAC renamed itself the C.D. Howe Research Institute in 1973 following a merger with the C.D. Howe Memorial Foundation, an organization created in 1961 to memorialize the Right Honourable Clarence Decatur Howe. In 1981, the Institute adopted its current name after the Memorial Foundation again became a separate entity in order to focus its work more directly on memorializing C.D. Howe. The C.D. Howe Institute will celebrate its 50th Anniversary as the gold standard for public-policy research in 2008.

The Institute encourages participation in and support of its activities from business, organized labour, associations, the professions, and interested individuals. For further information, please contact the Institute's Development Officer.

The Chairman of the Institute is Guy Savard; Jack M. Mintz is President and Chief Executive Officer.

C.D. Howe Institute
125 Adelaide Street East
Toronto, Ontario M5C 1L7
tel.: 416-865-1904; fax: 416-865-1866;
e-mail: cdhowe@cdhowe.org
Internet: www.cdhowe.org
The Importance of Being Less Earnest:
Promoting Canada’s National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.

J.L. Granatstein

Historian and Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century

Toronto, October 21, 2003

Sponsored by
George Weston Limited
Foreword

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March brought to a head an already vigorous debate about Canada’s role in the world and its place in North America. The sharpest public exchanges took place over the war itself and Canada’s decision not to join the U.S., Britain and other nations in toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein without approval by the United Nations Security Council. However, Iraq only brought to a boil broader issues that had been simmering for several years. They include such questions as whether Canada should ever pursue foreign-policy objectives outside of multilateral bodies like the UN. As the discussion broadened, Paul Martin staked out his position in a speech to the Canadian Newspaper Association. Martin, expected to be Canada’s next prime minister, noted that this country should achieve its overseas aims using multilateralism and the United Nations where possible, but that is only one avenue of several that can be considered.

The critical issue, however, is what are Canada’s real interests in the pursuit of foreign policy. Jack Granatstein’s Benefactor’s Lecture goes right to the heart of the matter. He provides a historical review of the evolution of Canada’s foreign policy and comes to the critical conclusion that it may be directed at the wrong objectives and for the wrong reasons. As long ago as Greek and Roman times, countries have conducted foreign policy in such a way as to promote their domestic political and economic interests. Granatstein argues that Canada’s current approach is based on the promotion of certain principles and values, failing to take seriously the pursuit of its national interests. He says the overarching interest is the management of Canada’s relationship with the United States as an expression of its own sovereignty. Granatstein agrees with a comment made by Deputy Prime Minister John Manley: “The world needs a middle power like Canada that brings a point of view to the world that is rooted in North America, but which is independent from the United States”.

The Institute’s aim in presenting the Benefactors Lecture series is to raise the level of public debate on issues of national interest by presenting diverse points of view. In doing so, the Institute hopes to give Canadians much to think about, including information they need to exercise their responsibilities as citizens.

I wish to thank our Benefactor this year, George Weston Limited, for its generous support of this lecture.
Kevin Doyle edited the lecture, with help from Lenore d’Anjou, and Wendy Longsworth prepared it for publication. As with all C.D. Howe Institute publications, the opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute’s members or Board of Directors.

Jack M. Mintz
President and Chief Executive Officer
C.D. Howe Institute
The prime minister and the president did not get on well. The younger president, his election tarnished by voting irregularities, did not show the deference the older and more experienced prime minister expected — and had, in fact, usually received from the president’s predecessor. All this played to the Canadian’s strong anti-Americanism, his reluctance to be pushed around by the superpower, and fed into the older man’s conviction that his own judgement remained sound and that his nation’s moral standing soared over that of the neighbour’s. Even the gravest of threats to the security of North America failed to move him very far or very fast, and the Americans grew ever more furious.

The wires between Washington and the embassy in Ottawa hummed until the ambassador, his patience finally at the breaking point over what he described as Canada’s “neurotic” political leadership that “has made anti-Americanism and indecision practically its entire stock in trade,” received the go-ahead. Now he could strike at the government’s weak spot: a Canadian public that wanted to be independent of the U.S. but also fretted continually about getting out of step with the southern giant.

It was January 1963. John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government was on the verge of implosion, its road to the Opposition benches and the dustbin of history helped mightily by a U.S. State Department press release, drafted in the embassy, that slammed the prime minister for his failure to propose “any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defence” (Granatstein 1996, 132–33).

In the context of modern history, the angry remarks by Ambassador Paul Cellucci in the aftermath of the Jean Chrétien government’s refusal to support the United States in its war against Iraq were not a unique event. (Jones 2003b, 26; Kergin 2003, 5). The 1962/1963 crisis over nuclear weapons that led the John F. Kennedy Administration into a heavy-handed intervention in Canadian politics and brought Lester Pearson’s Liberals to power was not dissimilar to the events that would roil Canada-U.S. relations 40 years later. For his part, Pearson had serious difficulties of his own with Lyndon Johnson’s government over Vietnam, while Pierre Trudeau faced substantial scorn from Ronald Reagan’s government for the so-called peace initiative of 1983/1984. Even Brian Mulroney, often painted by nationalists as a puppet of Washington for his efforts to establish and maintain what he referred to as “super relations” with the U.S., moved very cautiously before committing Canadian ships, aircraft and some troops to the Gulf War in 1991.

In other words, Canada is not the United States. Canada has less power, wealth and population. It also has a different history, different institutions, different ties to nations overseas, and, as a result, its national interests and values are not necessarily the same as those of its great neighbour. Anti-
Americanism has been and, to a substantial degree, remains Canada’s state religion, the very bedrock of Canadian nationalism, its strength rising and falling with events. Our present leaders still use it knowingly to manipulate public opinion. Yet Canada has to live beside the United States, and the ever-increasing interconnectedness of the two nations makes the fostering of a satisfactory relationship more important with each day. This demands that Canada at last begin to define its national interests and values in a realistic manner. For a nation that is as old as Canada, the fact that we think we know our values but fail to understand our interests is unsettling. We have failed to determine what is truly critical to us, we fall back on our self-professed values, greatly overrating their importance, and, as a result, we fail to base policy on our national interests. In the new world of the 21st century, this self-indulgence can be sustained only at a high price.

Looking at the Facts

First, a few truisms need to be stated. Canada is part of the world community, and it has and will continue to have multilateral interests and obligations. But Canada is inescapably part of North America, and, however much some Canadians may wish they could alter this fact, they cannot. We are joined to the United States hip and thigh, and this will not change. The Americans may make major alterations in their strategic dispositions around the world, but our location along the U.S.’s northern border guarantees that the United States must take an interest in Canada for pressing U.S. strategic reasons. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938 put it succinctly: “I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened” (Canada 1938, 4). A few days later, Prime Minister Mackenzie King offered Canada’s reciprocal pledge: “We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of them is to see that...our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that...enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air, to the United States, across Canadian territory” (ibid., 7).

Both nations were serving their own — and each other’s — interests with these promises. Sensible Canadians then (as now) understood that their nation’s defence ultimately was provided by the United States. They also recognized that Canada could never allow its defences to decay so much that

1 “I make it my policy [not to do what the Americans want],” Prime Minister Chrétien was overheard saying to other leaders at a summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Madrid in July 1997. “It’s popular.” Hampson and Molot call the comment “ill-publicized” (1998, 12).
the United States believed itself in danger because of Canadian weakness, obliging the U.S. to take over the complete defence of the northern half of the continent whatever Canadians might say about it. The impact of any such action on Canadian sovereignty should be obvious. As Mackenzie King put it in 1936, it would be humiliating “to rely on the United States without being willing to at least protect our neutrality.” If Canada were independent, the nation would have “an enormous cost to meet in the way of defence.” (Hillmer and Granatstein 1994, 134). Nothing today differs from the King years. Indeed, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, have guaranteed that the U.S. interest in Canadian geography remains as focussed as it has ever been in the last century.

Canada’s economic prosperity similarly depends on the U.S. market. The British trade and investment market was once critical for Canada, but this has not been so for more than three-quarters of a century. Efforts to switch trade from the United States back to Britain or to Europe and Japan have been tried (John Diefenbaker’s impromptu 1957 call for a 15-percent diversion from the U.S. to Britain was one; Pierre Trudeau’s Third Option in the 1970s was another) and roundly failed. Canada-U.S. trade has doubled in dollar volume since 1994, with some $2 billion in trade crossing the border each day, 85 percent of Canadian merchandise exports going to or through the United States, 23 percent of American exports coming north, and the U.S. buying almost 40 percent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP). Canada’s dependence on the U.S. market for its economic success is a demonstrable fact.²

Canadian Ambivalence

Still, Canadians’ ambivalent attitude toward their U.S. neighbour remains stubbornly unchanged. Canadians like to think that they understand the Americans better than any others, though there is little evidence of this in, for example, the way Ottawa misunderstood the U.S. reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001. We want to enjoy all the benefits of the North American standard of living, and we consider it our right to trade with and visit the U.S., all the while reading U.S. books and magazines and watching U.S. television. At the same time, Canadians sneer at America, bemoan its flag-waving patriotism and aggressive bumptiousness on the world stage, and have half-persuaded themselves that they could really run the world better.

---

² It is worth noting, in addition, that 82 percent of Canadian goods and services exports go south and that Canada receives 72 percent of its merchandise imports and 70 percent of its goods and services imports from the U.S. (Canada 2003b, Table 1c).
The endemic anti-Americanism in Canada, a product of history, proximity and a different institutional culture, does Canadians no credit. This attitude will not change, however, without leadership from the same political and cultural elites who regrettably continue to use anti-Americanism for their own purposes. It should be obvious to everyone that anti-Americanism hurts, rather than helps, Canada in dealing with the superpower with which it shares the continent. Unfortunately, too many Canadians are oblivious, or deliberately blind, to this basic truth (Granatstein 1996, passim). Restoring Canadians’ sight on this issue should be a priority. The nation now must take the essential steps to rethink its policies, restore its defences, and restructure its cabinet machinery and the bureaucracy that the government maintains in Ottawa and in the U.S. to reflect the overwhelming importance the United States has for us.

A Delicate Dance of Interests and Values

Canada is a nation that rarely discusses its national interests. A colony of France and Britain for centuries — indeed, a historical anomaly in some senses — Canada assumed that its interests were identical with those of the metropolis. Canadians even went into the world wars in 1914 and 1939, to cite the two most important examples, with scarcely anyone asking whether such actions served this country’s interests; it was enough that Britain was threatened.³

The first real attempt to state Canada’s interests in foreign policy did not come until two years after the end of the Second World War. Louis St. Laurent, the secretary of state for external affairs, delivered a lecture in Toronto, in 1947, defining the principles upon which Canadian foreign policy rested: “national unity, political liberty, the rule of law, the values of Christian civilization, and a willingness to accept international responsibilities” (Bothwell 1981, 105–6). That was as close as any senior minister came to stating national interests for years. Then in 1969, the Trudeau government fixed the nation’s defence priorities as sovereignty, North America, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and peacekeeping, in that order. The next year it issued Foreign Policy for Canadians. The series contained six booklets, as Allan Gotlieb says, with “hexagons, goals, values, objectives, and many prescriptions” but, incredibly, nothing on Canadian strategies for dealing with the United States, the core of Canadian national interests. The study

³ Sir Robert Borden said that “the ‘national’ interests of Canada and the ‘imperial’ interests of Canada during the Great War were demonstrably the same” Brown (quoted in 1992, 44). I am indebted to Norman Hillmer for reminding me of this remark.
The Importance of Being Less Earnest

is less than useful as a result and offers no hard assessment of Canadian imperatives, other than to call for social justice, quality of life, and economic growth (Gotlieb 2003b; see also Hillmer and Granatstein 1994, 288-90). *Canada in the World,* the Chrétien government’s foreign policy white paper of 1995, did little better and indeed shoved the projection of values abroad to the fore. The idea of national interests seems to have drifted away almost totally, while the nation endlessly prattles about superior values.

What Are Those Values?

Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Bill Graham invited Canadians in January 2003 to engage in an online dialogue on Canada’s foreign policy, and a paper set out his department’s baseline position. Despite some brief discussion of Canadian foreign policy goals, there is scarcely any mention of Canada’s national interests in a paper intended to point the way to a review of foreign policy. The minister and his department either do not think in such terms, or they regard interests as so obvious that they need no elaboration. Or, perhaps, there is a concern that many earnest Canadians might think it abhorrent even to suggest that a country as idealistic and moral as ours has national interests. The unspoken belief may be that Canada thinks and acts only in terms of multilateral processes and its concomitant, the global good.

On the other hand, Graham’s truly vapid, preachy paper has not the slightest hesitation in raising “values” to prominence:

> Canada’s foreign policy agenda must reflect the nation we are: a multicultural, bilingual society that is free, open, prosperous and democratic. The experiences of immigrants from around the world and the cultures of our Aboriginal peoples are woven into the fabric of our national identity. Respect for equality and diversity runs through the religious, racial, cultural and linguistic strands forming our communities. (Ibid.)

---

4 *Canada in the World* (Canada 1995) named thee objectives: prosperity, protection of security, and projection of values and culture abroad. See also Malone (2001, 561ff).

5 Paul Martin, whom Graham supported for Liberal leader and prime minister, also places Canadian values — freedom, tolerance, mutual respect, democracy and pluralism — first. But in his opening leadership campaign address on foreign policy, he did say, unlike Graham: “We have our interests, too” (Martin 2003; see also Nossal 2003). Curiously, as I discovered after drafting this address, both Nossal and Denis Stairs, Canada’s two leading foreign policy scholars, have articles on the need for clarity in Canadian interests appearing in late 2003. That senior scholars have such articles coming out surely indicates a switch in attention toward Canadian interests.
The paper goes on to suggest that Canada use its position to “promote our values” abroad and so advance its humanitarian and human rights concerns. “One of the most internationally respected elements of Canada’s foreign policy,” it says, “is our long-standing advocacy of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, respect for diversity, gender equality and good governance.” It then notes Canada’s flexible federalism, its respect for cultural differences, and its core values of democracy, human rights, diversity and civility (ibid.).

But is multiculturalism really a Canadian value? Is gender equality? Flexible federalism? Civility? We might hope they are, but, even if so, should Canada try to export such values to all societies, including those theocratic ones that believe in patriarchy and stress religious purity or those that believe civility to be a Western conceit? There is a danger here that we will sound overbearing and patronizing, implicitly suggesting that our values are universal, rather than merely postmodernist and politically correct. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trades comes perilously close to claiming a status for Canada as a moral superpower (or to a parody of the Indigo and Chapters bookstores’ slogan “The World Needs More Canada”) when it says “A better world might look like a better Canada” (ibid.; see also, Canada 2003c). If only the Palestinians and Israelis and the Indians and Pakistanis would settle their differences in the prescribed Canadian manner!

If Canada actually put up sufficient funds to help it live up to its self-professed image as a caring, sharing nation, we might legitimately be able to press our values on the world.6 Perhaps. But very few of the values the ministry’s paper trumpets are truly entrenched in Canadian society. Multiculturalism has been government policy for only three decades, hardly long enough to be pronounced immutably Canadian. The yet-to-be-achieved goal of gender equality has been in place for even less time, flexible federalism is a swear word to some Canadians, and Canada’s good governance is not quite the model for the world we might wish it to be. Values that are not long-lived and widely cherished by the Canadian people may be seen more as government propaganda than as expressions of the popular will.

On the other hand, most Canadians agree that their country is secular, democratic, liberal, and pluralist, the last a less politically contentious word than multiculturalism. No one would take issue with the fact that freedom is

---

6 We don’t provide such support, suggests one recent and authoritative U.S. study. In 2003, the Center for Global Development in Washington and the journal Foreign Policy ranked the 21 richest nations on how their aid, trade, migration, investment, peacekeeping and environmental policies help or hurt poor nations. Canada ranked 18th, well down in every category except trade and migration.
a core value we share. If the foreign minister truly feels compelled to press our values on the world, these indisputable ones, the basis of our national life and the foundation of our success, are those that we ought to be encouraging. Unfortunately, very little in Bill Graham’s on-line dialogue refers to these harder-edged values.

The fundamental truth is that these few but important Canadian traits aside, values or principles are for individuals, while nations have interests above all. Canadians need to know what their government considers to be Canada’s national interests. They must be spelled out, and policy must be based on a clear conception of what truly matters, not on perpetually calling for multilateral processes in the tiresome Ottawa way or on some vague and shifting sense of what Canada and Canadians might be or stand for.

Things that Matter

National interests are not difficult to detail for most nations, and Canada’s, in fact, are very clear:

1. Canada must protect its territory, the security of its people, and its unity.
2. It must strive to protect and enhance its independence.
3. It must promote the economic growth of the nation to support the prosperity and welfare of its people.
4. It must work with like-minded states, in and outside international forums, for the protection and enhancement of democracy and freedom.

This statement of interests is deliberately blunt, omits many subtleties, and includes both ultimate goals and instruments (or ends and means). The first, second and third of these interests are unquestionably Canada’s domestic goals, and they threaten no other nation or people. They state simply and clearly what any nation must do in its own interests.

The foremost national interest is that Canada must keep its territory secure and protect its people, the basic task of government. The question of unity is more difficult, given the nation’s history of linguistic and regional factionalism. All that needs to be said in this paper is that it is a mistake to act against the will of any large region of the country. Surely, as Louis St. Laurent said in 1947, “Our external policies shall not destroy our unity.” At the same time, it is an error not to act abroad if most of Canada wishes to do so. Squaring the circle might be easier, but managing this national interest carefully and properly is absolutely critical for any government, “the ultimate litmus test,” says one scholar, “for any international or domestic policy” (Mackenzie 2003, 6).
The second national interest could be interpreted by some as being directed against the United States, the only state that can jeopardize Canadian sovereignty in the foreseeable future. The U.S. does not pose a military challenge to Canada and has not for more than a century, but it is nonetheless a benign threat. Its powerful magnetic pull, the vigour of its corporations, culture and institutions could put Canadian independence in question. It is in Canada’s clear interest that this not occur, and we must seek out the ways to ensure Canada’s survival as an independent nation.

The third national interest, however, all but forces Canada’s government to promote beneficial trade with the huge market to the south. The tension between the two interests, the two national goals, will always be present, but, like the conundrum of unity, it must be managed. As with unity, getting the balance right between these interests is a test of a government’s capability.

The fourth statement of national interest, a means toward the furtherance of Canadian security, may be more contentious to some of today’s Canadians than it was to our forefathers, but it is neither messianic nor a call for a manifest destiny. It merely reflects our own history, the global record of the last century, and the troubling way the 21st century has begun. Cooperation with our friends and allies has been the means through which we have survived and prospered. Canada has been threatened in the past by the rise of dictatorships and oligarchies, and the spread of liberty, democracy, and economic freedom remains the best guarantor against future threats to us. We have a genuine interest in working with our friends to help protect and encourage the spread of political and economic freedom around the world.

Balances

A sensible foreign policy should be based on established national values and the country’s clear national interests, with the two categories properly weighed and balanced (cf. Malone 2003, 8). Interests, always important and always permanent (though the priority of one over another and the ways of achieving them will certainly change over the long term), must be at the fore. Often more transitory, ordinarily subject to interpretation, and, in Canada, usually dripping with self-congratulatory moralistic rhetoric, our values are important to us, but they must be subordinated to interests. Canada needs to re-balance its understanding of national interests and values as it moves through the difficult and dangerous times of the present era. Our values will count for nothing if the nation does not survive and for very little if we fail to prosper.

This does not mean that Canada should play only hardball realpolitik in its foreign and defence policy. The Canadian people almost certainly want
their idealism to have an important place in their nation’s dealings with the world. But our governments must always act to protect the nation’s interests first and foremost, carefully weighing the hard-headed achievement of them with the more idealistic promotion of Canadians’ values. Practicality has ordinarily been in the forefront of Canada’s trade policy, where we have worked hard and with substantial success to create organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that have rules-based regimes. But sometimes practicality has been in short supply in Canadian foreign and defence policy, occasionally being sacrificed to the earnest promotion of values that do not always serve the country’s core interests. What the nation needs is a foreign policy of realism tempered by the application of its values. More realism, in other words, and less moral earnestness.

The Multilateralist Impulse

James H. Taylor was undersecretary of state for external affairs from 1985 to 1989 and is a man with a reputation for thoughtfulness. In a paper written in 1999, he notes:

Canada is overwhelmingly dependent on the United States as an export market and very heavily dependent on it as a source of imports, whether of goods, ideas, technology or capital…. To have unhindered, trouble-free access to the world’s closest, richest and most open market is a vital Canadian interest.

And he goes on to observe: “Happily, such access is, broadly speaking, available most of the time. Many Canadians, however, have viewed this dependence with alarm, as a factor of national weakness and vulnerability” (Taylor 1999, p. 7).

Taylor states the public’s response to the nation’s dependence on the U.S. market succinctly. But it is also abundantly clear that the presence of the United States dominates virtually all aspects of Canadian foreign and defence policy. And this dominance, too, is viewed with alarm by many Canadians.

Cold-War Realities

By the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, Canada was tightly tied into the continental economy, a process of integra-
tion that continues still. The Soviet military threat guaranteed that the cooperation of the militaries of the two nations, begun in the war, would continue apace. The story is too well-known to need reiteration beyond pointing to a few of the highlights: the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance and Canada’s decision to dispatch troops to Western Europe, the Korean War, and the North American Air Defence Agreement. Canadian governments properly assessed the national interest in keeping democratic Europe free, aggressive communism in check, and North America defended and went willingly into an American-dominated world.

In truth, our leaders decided that the benefits of taking the American road far exceeded those of striving for expensive neutrality or a penurious independence. Geography could let the Swedes be neutral — at a high cost in defence spending. Island status could permit Cuba a kind of psychologically impoverished independence. Canada was no island and its geography made cooperation with the United States essential. Neutrality that was offensive to the Americans would have required a huge Canadian defence budget, and few were prepared to pay this price, even if it had been — and it was not — in the national interest.

Not all Canadians accepted this as a fact, and endemic anti-Americanism flared up repeatedly. John Diefenbaker’s attacks on the Kennedy Administration for what he described as ramming nuclear weapons down Canada’s throat, for example, almost obscured the fact that he had willingly agreed to take the weaponry. His miraculous semisurvival in the 1962 election, the most anti-American campaign since that over reciprocity in 1911, was proof of the potency of playing to the suspicions Canadians still harboured about their neighbours.

However, if the American road was not the preferred one for many, where else could Canada go? The Commonwealth was one possibility, but with Britain dissolving its empire and creating a weak, fractious organization in its place, this was never a realistic political or economic choice. NATO was a second possibility; the Treaty’s Article 2 conceivably pointed the alliance toward political and economic integration. This did not happen, and, although Canada sought to use the multilateral nature of NATO as a counterweight to its bilateral relationship with the U.S., the alliance itself was dominated by the Americans.

That left the United Nations. Canadians had been present at the creation of the UN but, initially at least, had little faith in it. The Cold War atmosphere pervaded and paralysed the UN, and although the organization resisted North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, this was possible only because the Soviet Union was absent, its representatives fortuitously boycotting the Security Council at the time. What made the United Nations
a Canadian icon was the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Lester Pearson, then
external affairs minister, conjured an emergency force out of war, fear, and
confusion. Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for interposing the first large
peacekeeping force between the British, French and Israelis on one side and
the Egyptians on the other.

Even though his efforts held the Western alliance together, Pearson’s
achievement at the UN was not unanimously hailed by Canadians. Once he
received the Nobel Prize, however, peacekeeping became Canada’s métier.
Canadians fell in love with the idea of keeping the peace, almost literally
forcing their government to take a major part in every peacekeeping opera-
tion even when participation made little military or political sense. Canadi-
ans had to serve in Lebanon, Yemen, Western New Guinea, the Congo and
dozens of other troubled states and regions. Sometimes, these roles were
hazardous, as when Ottawa threw lightly armed soldiers into combat in
Cyprus in 1974 and into serious danger in the Congo in 1960. Prime minis-
ters and foreign ministers tried to emulate Pearson’s diplomatic coup, some-
times with success (Paul Martin and Cyprus in 1964) and sometimes with
failure (Jean Chrétien and the Congo in 1995). If Canada were a middle
power locked into a bilateral relationship with the United States, it could
nonetheless work at the multilateral UN and do things the superpower U.S.
could not do. Canadians revelled in the belief that they were the keepers of
the world’s peace and in the thought that somehow the world recognized
their nation’s high moral standing. The Americans might be a military
superpower, but Canada was the moral superpower, its values supreme, or
so we told ourselves at every opportunity. Americans made war, the mantra
ran, but we kept the peace.

While the Cold War was underway, this made some sense. Canada was
acceptable in parts of the world where other alliance nations were not. The
country carried no colonial baggage and its bonafides were usually recog-
nized. At the same time, Canada knowingly and deliberately did its peace-
keeping to serve Western and NATO interests. It agreed to join the Interna-
tional Control Commission in 1954 in the former Indochina for this reason; it
went into the Congo in 1960 because the area was then a theatre in the Cold
War, and it took the lead in creating the UN Force in Cyprus in 1964 because
the possibility of war between Greece and Turkey, NATO allies, was
unthinkable.

---

7 Support for peacekeeping — and peacemaking — in public opinion generally remained
high even through the military difficulties of the 1990s. See Martin and Fortmann (2001,
46ff).

8 This is the main argument in Maloney (Maloney 2002).
The Post-Cold War Chill

Once the Cold War ended, however, Canada’s indispensability disappeared. The demands on the UN increased as the dead hand of Moscow fell away from Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The barrier to U.S. participation in peacekeeping disappeared at the same time as peacekeeping — usually involving small groups of observers or buffer forces between combatants — began to be transformed into peace support or peacemaking, both of which soon became synonymous with war. Backed by substantial public support, the Canadian Forces (CF) continued to take part in such operations, paradoxically at the same time as the capabilities of the military began to collapse. The end of the Soviet threat, the subsequent elimination of Canada’s European role in NATO, and the federal deficit that forced major defence spending cuts combined to weaken the CF dramatically throughout the 1990s. So bad had things become that Lloyd Axworthy, then foreign minister, preached a moralistic, soft-power human-security policy to the world, in effect making Canada’s weakness-is-strength into an Orwellian virtue. (Hampson and Oliver 1998). Moreover, “Canadians are moved by humanitarian impulse, not by the cold-blooded or rational calculations of realpolitik,” says UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, with extraordinary force and precision. “Principles are often more important than power to Canadians” (Heinbecker 2000).

If power has not mattered to Canadians, neither have their armed forces. By the beginning of the 21st Century, the Canadian Forces had lost their ability to serve Canadian interests in a sustained, effective way in peacekeeping, peacemaking, or war. Shortages of equipment and personnel all but eliminated Canada’s military capacity (Ignatieff, 2003), and an all-singing, all-dancing military, a CF able to do everything with relatively little, was gone. What, if anything, is to replace it remains very unclear as Canadians await a new prime minister. The one certainty is that the Canadian public will demand that Canada’s peacekeeping role continue, even if peace-

---

Prime Minister Chrétien did not grasp this point. At the end of May 2003, he pledged troops for any new peacekeeping force set up to protect a Palestine-Israel peace. “We will be able to help if we are needed,” he said. “There is no doubt about it.” Chrétien added: “Peacekeeping has always been the No. 1 priority for Canada. We are able to send troops at short notice and can move faster than others.” The very same day, however, the incoming Chief of the Land Staff, General Rick Hillier, said he doubted troops could be found for such an operation. The troops, the general said, were stressed and “at the top end of our capability.” Hillier was right, Chrétien wrong. (Fife 2003; see also Canadian Press 2003). By mid-June, Foreign Minister Bill Graham had concluded Canada should not despatch troops to the region (Edwards 2003).
keeping as it exists in the public mind\textsuperscript{10} no longer has any relevance in the new world disorder of civil wars and terrorism in which we live.

\textit{The Fantasy of the UN}

Peacekeeping’s extraordinary longevity and popularity in the Canadian imagination has also led to the UN’s major role in Canadian governmental and public discourse. This is extremely puzzling, for the UN’s failings are manifold, not least in peace operations where Canadian military planners had to learn to work around UN headquarters’ ceilings on equipment when, as was often the case in the former Yugoslavia, the situation on the ground exposed Canadian troops to danger. The UN old-boys’ club of incompetent officials and its inability to reinforce adequately its small peacekeeping force in Rwanda, to cite another example, left the Canadian force commander, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, completely unable to prevent a horrific genocide (L. MacKenzie 2003; see also Granatstein 2000, 45ff). The United Nations has proven to be a weak reed, most especially when it confronts the peace and security issues it was created to address.

Yet Canadians profess to love the UN and the idea of multilateral security. Sheila Copps, a candidate for the Liberal leadership, attacked her front-running rival Paul Martin because, as she put it, he has made “very clear that the United States trumps the United Nations.” Said Ms. Copps: “In my books, the United Nations trumps any individual country and I think the strength of Canada is going to be in building...multilateral relationships, especially and including the United Nations” (McCarthy 2003). This type of UN-centric attitude, very widespread during the long Security Council debates in 2002 and 2003 prior to the Iraq war, led to the government’s quite incredible decision to support the United States in the war only if the Council gave its assent to military force. France and its friends on the Security Council guaranteed this would not happen, and Canada, flying in the face of its national interests, chose to refuse its neighbour political and military support (Keating 2003, 2; Harvey 2003, 200ff).

The Iraqi crisis revealed in boldface the fundamental truth: the United Nations is dysfunctional. Paul Martin stated it well in a major address on foreign policy: “With Iraq, we witnessed a failure in the capacity of the international community to forge a shared consensus on how to proceed” (Martin

\textsuperscript{10} Awareness of the specifics of Canadian peacekeeping, however, is not high. In the Canada Day poll taken by Dominion Institute/Ipsos Reid on July 1, 2003, three in 10 Canadians could not name a single operation Canada participated in during the 1990s, and, another three in 10 could name only one.
An organization created at the end of the Second World War, the UN today is a relic of that era, perfectly preserved in amber. How can it be anything else if France has a Security Council veto? Rather than simply bleating that the UN’s processes should be supreme, a responsible Canadian role would be to press strongly for ways to remake the UN to fit the needs of a new century and a very different world (Sallot 2003). The UN is important for the services provided by its agencies, which range from the World Health Organization to the International Refugee Organization, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and a host of other bodies. As a political forum, regrettably, it has been, and is, much less successful. Canada might usefully try to galvanize efforts to change the organization. If it cannot be reformed, Canada would be most unwise to hang its multilateral hat on such a wobbly structure.

NATO and a G-20

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is much more important to Canada’s national interests than the UN, even if it cannot counterbalance the United States’ weight in North American defence. NATO brings together the Western European democracies and, more recently, the liberated nations of Eastern Europe with North America. The alliance peacefully won the Cold War and still plays a critical role in keeping Europe at peace. NATO mans the stabilization forces in the former Yugoslavia and fought a successful humanitarian war in Kosovo against Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. (Canada participated in the war with fighter aircraft and troops for the Kosovo Implementation Force — which had no UN sanction, something that seemed to have been forgotten in the debate over Iraq.)

NATO has provided the bulk of the present peacekeeping force for Afghanistan, a very dangerous and major out-of-area deployment and one of interest to Canada. When the Chrétien government surprised the Canadian Forces with its announcement of a major deployment to the Central Asian nation on February 12, 2003, a task essentially beyond the military’s capabilities (and supply lines!), NATO took Canada off the hook two months later.

11 When John Manley was a candidate for the Liberal Party leadership, he made UN reform a central part of his foreign policy proposals. “This is no time to shirk our global responsibilities,” he titled an article in the Ottawa Citizen, (2003).

12 The 12-month CF commitment to Afghanistan in 2003/2004 has been estimated by the Conference of Defence Associations to cost “upwards of $900 million” — or more than the budget increase of $800 million given the military in February 2003 (e-mail from executive director, CDA, June 16, 2003).
by agreeing to command and coordinate the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. In effect, NATO would provide medical, engineering, and support units of the kind that Canada could not. Thus the alliance still matters to Canada, Europe, and the world, and membership continues to accord with Canadian interests and values. Moreover, NATO has demonstrated that it, unlike the UN, can adapt to new realities.\(^{13}\)

But if the UN cannot be changed, and that is probably the case, then Canada will have to choose its policy course when the next crisis occurs. Is the choice for Ottawa again to be bound by the Security Council? Or should Canada be guided by the principle that Martin suggests: “In appropriate circumstances, and consistent with our values, when full consensus on the right steps is not possible, we should be prepared to use the means necessary to achieve our international goals.” (Martin 2003). It was this phrase that led Ms. Copps to her attack on Martin and, as Martin is very likely to become prime minister, it is this phrase, heavily qualified as it is, that suggests Canadian foreign policy might break free from the hypocritical UN-multilateralist-anti-American box that Jean Chrétien has constructed. Martin’s suggestion was for the leaders of the 20 most important states “to help set the global agenda and to get working on important issues of global concern.” This new G-20 might work and might point the way to “a world where nations, not multilateral institutions, set the agenda” (ibid.). A new G-20 sounds suspiciously like yet another multilateral institution, but, even if it does work, the United States, the G-1 of the world, will unquestionably continue to set the agenda within which Canadians must operate.

**For or Against: There’s Little In-Between**

Certainly for the foreseeable future, the aftershocks of 9/11 are shaping Americans’ view of the world and their relationship with Canada. A war against terror and the states that sponsor it is at the top of the U.S. agenda, sharing space with homeland security. To the U.S. administration, righteous in its determination to smash the Islamic terrorists and their state sponsors, nations are either with Washington or against it, the United States’ own borders cannot be porous, and security trumps trade and everything else. The

---

\(^{13}\) The European Union sent its EUFOR military force on its first mission to Macedonia on March 31, 2003, significantly replacing a NATO force. The implications of an EU rapid-reaction force could make NATO redundant or, at a minimum, significantly affect what remains of Canada’s position in NATO.
vengeful single-mindedness with which the Bush administration approaches its tasks worries many.

Perhaps that helps explain why in Canada, the horror of 9/11 quick dissipated. Many Canadians, including the prime minister and others in government, apportioned some of the blame for the attacks on the gap between rich and poor nations or on U.S. policies (Alberts 2002). A few academics and journalists did not even wait for a week to pass. The unholy glee at U.S. casualties and discomfiture did not go unnoticed in the United States; neither did the stupid comments of the prime minister’s press secretary, at least one of his ministers, and far too many members of his parliamentary caucus as the U.S. began to mobilize support for the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. These Canadians and their friends did very serious damage to Canada’s relations with the White House and state department, and the prime minister’s belated, sincere efforts to discipline them worsened the problem, as did his gratuitous comments at the end of May 2003 on President Bush’s budget deficit. This problem of loose lips was manageable; that it caused the harm it did provides an example of the quality of leadership the prime minister delivered and the wretched example he set.

Thus, when Canada chose to elevate the processes of multilateralism to the status of a national interest by declaring that its position on war in Iraq would be determined by the Security Council’s decision, whatever it might be, the Americans were furious. The French and the Russians shaped their position of opposition to the U.S. on the basis of their own definitions of national interests. Canada, however, decided its stand on the basis of process in a bogged-down Security Council and refused to participate in, or lend political support to, the war. Foreign Minister Bill Graham put it this way on April 15, 2003:

> We would have preferred being able to agree with our close friends and allies [the U.S. and U.K.]. However...the decision...must always be consistent with Canada’s long-standing values and principles: in this case the recognition that the use of force must always be the last resort of states and our commitment to working through multilateral institutions to resolve questions of peace and security (Graham, 2003).

---

14 “Canadians should remember that, presumably to their surprise, there are many in the U.S. government who carefully register their words and the messages and attitudes behind them. It is a brutish political reality that systematic, open disrespect by a small weak state for a large and powerful state rarely ends to the benefit of the former” (Jones 2003b, 48). Jones was political minister-counsellor at the U.S. embassy in Ottawa from 1992 to 1996. For an informed (if self-serving) Canadian view, see Mulroney 2003.
Significantly, only values and process, not national interests, figured in his and his government’s thinking.

Relations between the Chrétien government and the Bush administration soon reached a low point that had not been equalled since the Kennedy-Diefenbaker era four decades before. The government bobbed and weaved in its policy toward the coming war; while the prime minister seemed to be exquisitely concerned with opinion polls. In Quebec, public opinion was very cool toward supporting the war, with the numbers opposed running at least 20 percent higher than in English Canada. This mattered, in particular, because of the coincidence of the provincial election campaign in Quebec. Voters there (and viewers at 24 Sussex Drive) saw all three party leaders sport antiwar ribbons during their televised debate. The way Quebec attitudes appeared to determine Canada’s course disturbed many. Alberta’s Ted Morton notes: “As the Iraqi war reminded us, Canadian foreign policy is set by public opinion in Quebec, which has meant abandoning our historical allies” (Morton, 2003).15

Former prime minister Brian Mulroney pointed out in 2002 that in the U.S., “The president energizes the process, so when word goes out that the president…likes and admires [the prime minister] and wants a file to be given the highest priority — that goes right through the system” (Fife 2002). The reverse is presumably also true, and President Bush has been turning visits to his Texas ranch into public declarations of his pleasure—and displeasure.16 Prime Minister Chrétien was noticeably not invited.

Curiously, Canada did not seem to have been seriously punished for its refusal to follow Washington’s lead on Iraq, probably because the Americans recognized that Chrétien would soon be gone and a new regime likely had to be interested in restoring relations.17 Also Canada was not on the UN

---

15 In some polls before the start of fighting, more than 83 percent of Canadians opposed war with Iraq without UN approval and 23.5 percent opposed Canadian military action in any circumstances. In Quebec, where all the leaders fighting a provincial election were antiwar, 50 percent of the population opposed war with or without a UN vote (Brean 2003). When asked in an Ipsos-Reid poll in June 2003 if Canada was justified in not supporting the U.S. in the Iraq War, 11 percent of respondents in Quebec, but 52 percent in Alberta, said no, a huge and almost unparalleled difference. (Lunman 2003).

16 British Prime Minister Tony Blair said that he genuinely trusted President Bush and that was “important.” He added, “When you go through something like [the Iraq war], you really find out whether you can or can’t trust somebody. Don’t ask me to go through all the world leaders and rate them on scores of 1-to-10” (Margolick 2001, 227). How Canada’s leader is rated by Blair or Bush would be interesting to discover.

17 Defence Minister John McCallum did talk of a chill in the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and in the provision of intelligence from U.S. sources (LeBlanc 2003).
Security Council during the Iraq war debates, and thus its opposition was somewhat less visible than that of the French, Germans, Mexicans and others. President Bush cancelled a visit to Ottawa scheduled for May 2003 and pointedly refused to reschedule it, the U.S. ambassador spoke out about his government’s disappointment, and industry leaders in Canada gave vent to their fears for the future of the economic relationship.

Special Treatment

What the Iraq crisis highlighted was the question of whether Canada would continue to receive the special treatment from the U.S. administration that Canadians have long taken for granted. Allan Gotlieb, former ambassador to Washington, noted that there are “101 ways we ask the Americans to take into account our special situation as their largest trading partner, chief energy exporter, reliable defence partner and so on.” After the Iraq war, would such consideration continue from the administration of a U.S. president not known for his forgiving nature? Would the “absence of goodwill…affect the willingness in Washington to make a special effort to take Canada’s unique circumstances into account?” (Gotlieb 2003a, 43).

If it does, Canadians are in trouble because Canada needs that special effort. After 9/11, the long delays in clearing traffic through border points had a brief but substantial impact on Canadian manufacturers. If there are future terrorist attacks (or even the threat of attacks), the impact next time might not be so manageable, particularly for vulnerable industries dependent on just-in-time inventory management or perishable goods. Canada fortunately has secured exemptions for Canadian citizens from the pending tough American immigration and customs procedures, but it could not get similar treatment for landed immigrants, a matter of substantial concern for many corporations and tens of thousands of individuals. With some 220 million border crossings each year, with airline security lineups increasing, and with border controls tightening for both goods and people, doing business in North America, on which Canada’s economy depends, becomes riskier every day (Goldfarb and Robson 2003). Yet, the Canadian government gambled and allowed the Iraq war to threaten the relationship, a decision that made no sense on any calculation of the national interest. A top priority for Canada must be to protect its economic links with the U.S. and that is the case no matter who fills the presidency. That the U.S. fought the war in Iraq to topple a monstrous dictatorship and liberate a people similarly suggests that participation would have served Canada’s national interests in protecting freedom and democracy.
Canadians also should remind themselves of the U.S.’s present conviction that security is more important than trade. After 9/11, no American government could survive without placing the country’s homeland and global security interests first. This has led the U.S. into wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and into major strategic reassessments. The Pentagon is shifting bases, transforming the military into a lighter, faster host, reevaluating alliances, and spending vast sums to ensure that the United States can be as secure as possible in an era of terrorism. Canada has been obliged in its own interest and in the interest of its relations with Washington to step up security. The immigration and refugee systems have been tightened at last, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has received a major increase in funding and personnel, and the government has put much time into creating a smart, secure border. All this is to the good, and Canadians now must consider if their interests dictate that they go further. A security perimeter around North America — with Canada inside the tent — will likely become essential if terrorism is not smashed soon. Those who argue for the Big Idea, a major and comprehensive economic and security package with the U.S., make precisely this point and push it even further. Canada faces hard choices, and the decisions must be based on Canada’s interests.

Defence Spending in Self-Defence

The one area since 9/11 where Canada has still done far too little is defence. The Canadian Forces received an $800 million increase in the February 2003 budget, but the CF’s needs for new equipment and more personnel are staggering. Much more money will be necessary to rebuild the military to a level that meets Canadian requirements. Canadians want to play a role in the world, and they want their soldiers to be able to make and keep the peace. Increasingly, they also seem to recognize that rebuilding the CF is essential (Bailey 2003). On a high-tech battlefield, in a world of smart bombs and global positioning systems (GPS), however, the budgetary demands can be endless. A full-scale defence review, followed by a white paper completed before the end of 2004, is vitally necessary to point to the areas where Canada wants to play its part. That review must recognize that what we now call peace-making is, in fact, what used to be called war. A robust military is a necessity, and ideally it would to be structured to operate abroad on a variety of

---

18 Dan Middlemiss’s assessment is particularly bleak: “Canada has long abandoned any pretence of robust self-defence, and has given but token acknowledgement to the military defence of its sovereignty at home... Canada is wholly dependent on the United States for its physical protection, and has largely taken on the trappings of a vassal state” (2003).
missions (with or without the participation of the United States), as well as at home. To maximize Canada’s military resources, the CF must be made as interoperable as possible with the forces of the U.S. and other friendly nations. The Canadian navy, for example, built its frigates in the 1980s and 1990s to work seamlessly with the ships of the United States navy in the anti-submarine warfare that was then one of the navy’s main roles. As it turned out, the Soviet submarine threat largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but the frigates’ interoperability enabled the Canadian navy to work with its U.S. counterpart around the world and, indeed, participate in and command task forces. Interoperability expands the nation’s ability to project power and lets Canada enhance its military capacities, not least because the necessary and expensive research and development have often been done elsewhere. The CF’s ability to work with friendly states, however, is threatened by the government’s failure to acquire up-to-date equipment for the armed forces and its continuing reluctance to solidify and deepen the military relationship with the U.S. (Mason 2003b, 8–9).

This is evident in the continuing debate over Canadian participation with the United States in its ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. The Bush administration is pressing ahead with this program, which is not yet functioning effectively. It is designed to protect North America against small-scale missile attacks from rogue states like North Korea or against accidental missile launches from states like China or Russia. Although the odds of such attacks are long today, they might not be tomorrow, and Canada has as much to gain from a moderate, land-based missile defence system as the U.S. For this reason, the government announced on May 29, 2003, its decision to begin discussions with the U.S. on possible Canadian participation in BMD.

There is, however, continuing opposition to BMD in the government and in the Liberal caucus and much fear of the so-called weaponization of space and of an escalation in American preemptive attacks and aggressiveness if the U.S. is protected against incoming missiles (Godfrey 2003; Fowlie 2003). This is a short-sighted position that once again threatens the national interest in maintaining a close defence relationship with the United States. It is, in fact, a classic instance of anti-Americanism affecting policy. Many elect-

19 The best source on this subject is Griffiths (2002). For a perfect example of confusing values with national interests, see Byers’ arguments against closer military relations with the U.S. because, among other things, Canadian service personnel’s rights might be affected if they are francophone, gay or lesbian, or female because the U.S. military regulations differ from the Canadian. Whether it is in Canada’s interest to have closer military relations or not, our values in these areas should not affect the decision. (Byers, 2002/2003, p. 101ff.)
ed Liberals, government officials, and media commentators view the world through anti-American lenses and see cooperation as a diminution of Canada’s sovereignty, overlooking the fact that cooperation can serve the national interest and, by getting Canada a share, however small, in the decision-making, enhance sovereignty.\textsuperscript{20} Certainly, the government’s early reluctance to work with the U.S. on BMD guaranteed that Canadian interests were not considered in working out the basing and command-and-control arrangements. “Indecision about participation in the program,” says Dwight Mason, a former U.S. chair of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, “has deprived Canada of influence on the system’s design and architecture especially as it may or could affect the defence of Canada” (Mason 2003a, 2; see also Rudd 2003). BMD will affect Canada whatever we do, and a refusal to participate can only diminish the country’s sovereignty.

The impact of a rejection of wholehearted cooperation in BMD could also lead to the complete marginalization or even the winding-up of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the Canada-U.S. military arrangement that has given Canada its present disproportionate voice in continental defence for almost a half-century.\textsuperscript{21} The present NORAD agreement expires in 2006. At a minimum, nonparticipation in BMD would mean that Canadians in NORAD could no longer participate in much of the warning-and-threat assessment process. It might also cut off the flow of space surveillance data Canada now receives. This would diminish Canadian influence in continental defence and increase Canadian difficulties in defending our airspace (Alberts 2003). But if Canada joins in BMD and if NORAD controls this — to be fair, something less than likely — Canada’s influence actually stands to increase as it expands its right to consultation, participation, and decision-making (Koring 2003). This is one decision that demands the application of a national interest calculus.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} “The new missile program is part of a dream long-nurtured in far-right Republican circles — the dream of fighting and winning a nuclear war,” or so said Linda McQuaig (2003) in one of the most foolish comments during the debate on BMD. Delay in joining in on BMD will ensure that no contracts for development are let in Canada. (see Tuck 2003).

\textsuperscript{21} See Granatstein (2003); Mason (2003b, 18-19, and Fergusson (2002). Fergusson notes (fn. 8) that NORAD operational costs are 90 percent borne by the U.S. and that capital costs in the U.S. were 100 percent carried by the U.S.; in Canada, historically two-thirds were paid by the U.S.

\textsuperscript{22} See the most recent Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade paper (Canada 2003a), the discussion in Granatstein (2002a, 10) and Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald (2002, esp. 10ff). Brian Mulroney suggested in May 2003 that it was too late for Canada to matter on BMD: “I don’t think the Americans much care… They’re going to do this anyway. Canada’s role is now peripheral” Ibbitson (2003).
In addition, as one Canadian expert, James Fergusson, puts it: “Missile defence is designed to protect a nation’s citizens, and the fundamental role of a democratic government is to provide protection to its citizens”. (Fergusson 2002, 7). Long-serving diplomat David Malone added: “If Canada wishes to engage seriously with the U.S. on geo-strategic matters, it will need to come to grips with the reality of American attachment to ballistic missile defence as the future cornerstone to continental defence.” It makes no sense, he writes, “for Canada to define its defence policy in out-dated and increasingly irrelevant terms,” (2003, 15). Canada must cease moralizing over things it cannot change and buy into BMD as quickly and completely as possible. The nation’s interests demand nothing less.

Getting To Win

Pollster Michael Marzolini recently observed that Canada has a “strange” relationship with the U.S.

Unqualified support for everything [the U.S. does] diminishes us in our own eyes. Yet we are their friends, and we owe much of our standard of living, as well as our safety, to our proximity and relationship.

Opinion polls, he added correctly, demonstrate that Canadians realize this (Marzolini, 2003). Still, anti-Americanism is as strong today in Canadian public life, academe and the media as it has been in the last half-century, so much so that it sometimes seems to have become a core value for many politicians and commentators. Anti-Americanism, however, is mean-spirited and openly based on an unhealthy mix of fear and envy. Moreover, it is clearly against the national interest.

It is time for Canadians to recognize that there is no shame in agreeing with the United States when its actions accord with our national interests and in working to advance those interests with Americans. Sovereignty is not necessarily lost by cooperation, and it can even be advanced by it. Nor is there any reason to resist U.S. policies for the sake of opposition. We can disagree with George W. Bush’s Washington, but we must pick our spots. On most issues, Canada can be as vocal as it chooses, slanging the Americans

23 Defence Minister John McCallum echoed this comment in announcing the Canadian decision to negotiate participation in BMD: “A sovereign government should not wash its hands of the protection of its own citizens” (quoted in Fowlie (2003)).
upside and down. Americans argue among themselves, too, and they will not be offended. Canadians can also posit their distinct views on global issues, and Deputy Prime Minister John Manley is correct in saying:

The world needs a middle power like Canada that brings a point of view to the world that is rooted in North America, but which is independent from the United States (Edwards 2003b).

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans believe that their vital interests are at stake and their security is gravely threatened. Canadians should have sense enough to be very cautious in challenging Washington on global or continental security questions. Ottawa must recognize that Washington is both a target for the world’s resentments and a superpower with global concerns vastly different from those of our small, weak nation. The events of 9/11 changed the U.S. The Canadian government and people have not yet grasped the fact that security now supersedes every other issue in Washington. This new reality obliges us to improve the ways in which we deal with the U.S. Canadian governments simply must recognize that their American policies, particularly those involving security, require much greater coordination.

Other issues come into play along the border as well. Decriminalizing marijuana use, for example, may well be sensible policy if looked at on its own, an easy way to differentiate Canada from the U.S. But does it make any sense if it angers the White House and the U.S. drug czar? Or if it leads to serious consequences along the border that affect the trade on which we depend and the flow of business and individual travel? This does not mean that Canada should refrain from moving on marijuana, nor does it mean that Canada must slavishly harmonize all its policies with those of the United States. It does, however, suggest that prioritizing issues is essential (Granatstein 2002b; Hunter 2003). And if the Canadian government decides to proceed with a particular measure that it knows will anger Washington, it should do so only with a full understanding of the consequences and a willingness to pay the costs involved. Hope is not a policy (Noble 2003).

Whether the nation chooses to move toward the Big Idea, the Canadian government desperately needs to come to grips with Canada’s U.S. problem. In the first days of his tenure, the incoming prime minister must make the relationship his major foreign policy priority, work to repair the harm done by the Chrétien government, and ensure that his ministers and backbenchers stay on message. He must also push departments to overcome their turf concerns and to cooperate in managing the Canada-U.S. file, at least on the most
critical issues. As well, he has to consider whether Canada requires a homeland security department to be able to cooperate more closely with Homeland Security Chief Tom Ridge’s huge new department in Washington. He should consider naming a deputy-minister-level ambassador to the U.S., with full access to the prime minister and cabinet. Also needed are a powerful cabinet committee on relations with the U.S., chaired by the prime minister or the deputy prime minister, and a mirror committee of deputy ministers, chaired by a deputy secretary to the cabinet, responsible for foreign and defence policy. Such steps can be taken in the first month a new leader is in office.

The government also needs a small national security council, operating under the privy council office and with close links to experts outside government, to deliver advice on security, broadly framed and interpreted, to the prime minister and cabinet. The creation of such a council should be a goal of the new prime minister’s first year in office. At the same time, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade should assign an associate deputy minister to manage the U.S. relationship.

Also, the government must provide the funds needed to increase staff at the Embassy in Washington, where the present Canadian complement of 50 is insufficient. We must have our ablest diplomats in Washington lobbying Congress and the administration and working to further the country’s vital interests. After budget cuts in the 1990s, Canadian consulates and offices in the U.S. dropped from 19 in 1994 to a paltry 14 today, and Canadian staff in the U.S. dropped from 146 to 108. This was false economy. Canada has to raise its representation in the U.S. (particularly in the south, southwest, and west where population and power are shifting), so that it has early-warning eyes and ears and trade promotion offices in every major city, region and sub-region of the country. The budget of February 2003 allocated just $11 million over two years for five to seven new consulates in the U.S. and in September, the government announced it would create seven, a good start. A useful stop-gap measure would be to name honorary consuls from expatriate, well-connected Canadians where Ottawa has no representation. (Smith, 2003; Fagan, 2002). Mexico, by comparison, has 63 consulates and offices in the U.S. By the time the new prime minister is ready to call an election, these changes should be in place.

Moreover, Canadians should realize that the United States is so huge and diverse that the one hand in Washington does not always know what the other five fingers in Iowa, Maine, Pennsylvania, Oregon, and North Dakota.

---

24 This idea has been endorsed by Paul Martin and by Allan Gotlieb (Gotlieb 2003c).
are doing. If the U.S. puts a higher tariff on wheat or softwood lumber, the
White House may not be directly involved. Under the U.S. system, interest
groups like North Dakota’s wheat farmers or the Pacific northwest’s timber
producers can raise trade issues, garner congressional support, and all but
oblige the U.S. trade representative and the commerce department to take
action. This will always cause Canada problems, no matter how close the
bilateral relationship becomes.

When the White House takes an active part in a trade dispute, as it may
when the administration wants to send a shot across Canada’s bow, then we
can be in for trouble. However, if Ottawa can get its substantially smaller act
together and properly coordinate its dealings with the U.S., we might be able
to take fuller advantage of the cracks and fissures in the American body
politic. Proper planning on how best to deal with the U.S. should be a Cana-
dian core value; certainly it is in our national interest. It is also inescapably
true that broader strategic interests — the war in Iraq, for example — can
affect trade. Canadians need to keep that fact in mind and, moreover, under-
stand that it is up to them, not the Americans, to maintain good relations.

Small states have always formed coalitions of the weak to try to hobble
great powers. “Let’s be honest with ourselves,” says Gordon Smith, a former
deputy minister in Foreign Affairs. Canada’s interest in multilateralism

may have something to do with the fact that our neighbour to the south
is much more powerful than us, with the knowledge that Canada is off
the screen of political elites in the U.S. and with the belief we do better in
negotiations where more players are involved. (Smith 2002.)

Multilateralism can usefully be employed to help constrain the tendency
toward unilateral action and protectionism in the United States, and it is in
the Canadian interest — and in accord with Canadian values — to work
with our friends in international organizations to this end. But Canadians
cannot ever again allow their government to put them in the position of
opposing for the sake of opposition, as the Chrétien government did over the
Iraq war. The multilateral process may be a good in itself, but a close bilat-
eral relationship is an absolute necessity, critical to the national interest. If the
choice is between feeling good or eating regularly, Canada must be for nutri-
tion.

Ideally, Canadians ought to be able to feel good and eat regularly, for
multilateralism and bilateralism can usually exist in something close to har-
mony. This will certainly be true on most international issues, and Canadi-
ans must work to keep the tracks running parallel. When divergences occur,
as they certainly will, Canada has to choose, and on major security issues the choice must be for bilateralism. The nation mistook its loudly professed values for its interests and kicked sand in President Bush’s face over Iraq. In response, Ambassador Cellucci sent a message, and Canadians, their economy dependent on the colossus to the south, should listen to it. Perhaps we did, thus explaining the government’s eager willingness to assist in the rebuilding of Saddam’s destroyed state and to negotiate on President Bush’s plan for BMD — a “full grovel,” as columnist Richard Gwyn calls it (Gwyn, 2003a). Even so, it would have been better if we had not tried to have our bilateral cake while supping so intemperately at the multilateralists’ table.

If Canada carefully assesses its national interests and weighs them in relation to its values, the nation should be able to chart its course for the future. We have muddled through long enough, too often neglecting our interests, too frequently mistaking transitory values for permanent national goals. The United States will always be with us and getting on with the Americans must be on our minds at all times. If we wish to survive and prosper as a nation, we must come to terms with this inescapable fact. If a comprehensive economic and security arrangement is required as a means to the goals of survival and prosperity, then so be it.

Above all, Canada must have a plan, a long-range foreign policy strategy, and it must be based on what matters most to Canadians — their national interests. Allan Gotlieb, one of the few Canadian practitioners to speak and write in this vein, describes the need clearly: “If the foreign policy of a state is not based on its national interest, it can become arbitrary, quixotic or even a personal indulgence of its leader” (Gotlieb 2003a, 42). Canada has had too much of that type of unplanned, ill-thought out policy, so much so that today we verge on becoming a noncountry with a nonmilitary and a non-foreign policy — “invisible” and “irrelevant,” as the Toronto Star’s Gwyn writes (Gwyn 2003b; see also Cohen, 2003).

Canadians sometimes act as if they believe they are immune from the ills of the world. Some Americans may believe they constitute a new Rome, but most now realize that there are still barbarians out there who may yet sweep down on the imperium. Even Margaret Atwood, a true-believing nationalist always deeply skeptical of the Americans, says: “We know per-

---

25 And when Canada disagrees with the U.S.? I have come to favour the “quiet diplomacy” approach advocated in 1965 by long-time bureaucrat and diplomat Arnold Heeney: “It is in the abiding interest of both [Canada and the U.S.] that, wherever possible, divergent views …should be expressed and if possible resolved in private, through diplomatic channels.” (Heeney 1972, 189ff).
fectly well that if [the U.S.] goes down the plug-hole, we’re going with you” (Atwood 2003).

We share a continent, most values, many traditions, and much history. Ultimately, we share our bed with the Americans. After all, we Canadians helped make this bed, we lie in it, and we need to face up at last to the reality of our situation. Moral earnestness and the loud preaching of our values will not suffice to protect us in this new century. We have to put interests ahead of values, hard-headedness before wishful thinking. The alternative is too self-destructive to contemplate.
References


The Benefactors Lectures

2002  Canadian Health Care in a Global Context: Diagnoses and Prescriptions, by Åke Blomqvist


1997  The Economics of Privatization, by D.G. McFetridge.


Copies of Benefactors Lectures are available free of charge from the C.D. Howe Institute. Recent lectures that are now out of print can be obtained from the Institute’s website: www.cdhowe.org.